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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DELROY PORTER and KEITH W ) 
BETTRIDGE dba PORTER & 
BETTRIDGE, 
Plaintiff/Respondant, 
vs 
LARRY B. GROOVER, 
Defendant/Appellant ] 
) Case No. 20,956 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Respondents (herein after referred to as 
Plaintiff) brought this action to recover upon two partially 
unpaid assignment of claims received from the Assignors and 
real parties in interest, Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court ruled that there was not sufficient 
evidence to pierce the corporate veil in which the 
Defendant/Appellant (hereinafter referred to as Defendant or 
Mr. Groover) owned stock and which employed Mr. Groover, Karen 
Edwards and Judy C. Smith. (R. 382, Addendum 1,3.) However, 
the Trial Court gave Judgment to the Plaintiff against 
Mr. Groover personally for $6,110.50 on Karen Edward's claim 
and for $1,210.00 on Judy C. Smith's claim. (R. 382, Addendum 
1.) The Lower Court ruled that there was consideration for a 
contract; however, the consideration and resulting liability 
went to Mr. Groover personally. (R. 381, Addendum 1,3.) The 
Trial Court further ruled that there was not technically a 
condition precedent upon which the contract was dependent and, 
therefore, contractual liability existed. (R. 382, Addendum 3.) 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Defendant seeks to have this Court reverse the Judgment 
of the Trial Court and enter Judgment for the Defendant on the 
basis that the evidence at trial established that there was no 
consideration to support an agreement against the Defendant or 
the corporations which employed Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith 
and that there was an unfulfilled condition precedent thus 
removing any contractual duty to perform. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the summer and fall of 1980, Karen Edwards and Judy 
C. Smith were hired by Groover Financial Management 
Corporation. (R. 74, 75 and 147.) Defendant Larry Groover 
owned stock in and was employed by this corporation. (R. 233, 
234. ) 
Defendant mentioned to Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith 
after they were hired that they were eligible for bonuses from 
Groover Financial Management but the bonuses were dependent 
upon receipt of insurance renewal premiums that the corporation 
was servicing at the time for A. L. Williams Company. They 
were told that Groover Financial Management would allocate ten 
percent (10%) of these premiums renewals to the employees who 
qualified for bonuses. (R. 77, 79 and 294; see also 
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Plaintiffs1 Ex. No. 6.) Other bonuses such as trips and 
Christmas bonuses were also given. (R. 298.) 
In 1982f a corporation change occurred from Groover 
Financial Management to Balanced Financial Management. The 
Defendant, Mr. Groover was chairman of the new corporation 
Balanced Financial (R. 241 and 324.) (R. 296.) A corporation 
called Managed Accounting Services was formed and hired to 
provide accounting services for Balanced Financial Services. 
(R 291.) Karen Edwards eventually ended up working for Managed 
Accounting Services and its President Hal Rosen. (R. 322 and 
R.246.) The bonus program remained the same inasmuch as 
Balanced Financial serviced the life insurance policies that 
Groover Financial had serviced previously. (R. 297.) Balanced 
Financial, however, expanded its work to enhance and promote 
new or developing corporations and therefore would consider 
also purchasing stock in the developing corporations when they 
went public and would give the stock to the employee as 
bonuses. (R. 297.) While Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith were 
working for Balanced Financial Management, one of the companies 
which was being promoted was San Saba. Balanced Financial 
Management made investments in San Saba and was anticipating 
that the company would go public. (R. 248, 250, 304 and 
305.) 
On April 13, 1983, Karen Edwards went to Mr. Groover's 
office to resign. (R. 88.) An agreement was reached at that 
time whereby $2,500.00 would be paid in cash and $5,000.00 of 
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stock in San Saba, or the cash to buy the stock if it went 
public would be given. (R. 248.) The agreement was prepared 
by Karen Edwards and signed by Defendant. (R. 90, 127; see 
Plaintiff's Ex. 5, Addendum 4.) 
On or about April 28, 1983, Judy C. Smith visited with 
Defendant Groover concerning the payment of additional money as 
she wished to terminate her relationship with Balanced 
Financial Management. As a result of the discussion, a 
memorialization of a second agreement was also made. (See 
Ex. 8, R. 162, 163, Addendum 4.) 
Karen Edwards received $2,500.00 and Judy C. Smith received 
$1,000.00 which was the cash portion as itemized in their 
respective agreements. (R.93, 165.) 
After Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith left the corporations 
they assigned their claims to DeLoy Porter and Keith W. 
Bettridge, d.b.a. Porter & Bettridge, the Plaintiffs and 
Respondents in this case, Porter & Bettridge then brought an 
action to collect on the alleged agreements. 
Neither Judy Smith nor Karen Edwards were ever employed by 
Defendant Larry Groover individually. Defendant Larry Groover 
was never an officer or director in Managed Accounting 
Services, from which Karan Edwards got paid. (R. 93, 234, 
324.) The Court held, however, that Defendant received 
personal benefit from this. (Addendum 1). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THERE WAS CONSIDERATION 
FOR A CONTRACT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PLAINTIFF 
PROVIDED CONSIDERATION FOR A CONTRACT TO THE DEFENDANT 
SINCE THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS TO THE CONTRARY. 
The Trial Court erred when it ruled that there was 
consideration sufficient enough for a contract to bind the 
Defendant Larry Groover individually, to pay Plaintiffs. This 
was contrary to the evidence which was adduced at trial. 
This Court in Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch 
and Livestock Company, Inc., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) held: 
"The law does not enforce all promises. For a promise to 
be legally enforceable, it must be supported by 
consideration. Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 436, 361 
P.2d 177, 178 (1961); 17 C.J.S. Contracts, Section 71 
(1963.)" 
706 P.2d at 1036. 
In Resource Management this Court further defined 
consideration: 
"Consideration is an act or promise bargained for and given 
in exchange for a promise. Simmons v. California Institute 
of Technology, 34 Cal. 2d 264, 272, 209 P.2d 581, 586 
(1949); see Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Bohm, 286 
F.2d 494, 496 (9th Cir. 1961)." 
706 P.2d at 1036. 
The Second Restatement of Contracts also sets forth what 
the requirement of exchange and the types of exchanges that 
would support the requirement of consideration. 
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"Section 75. Requirement of Exchange; Types of Exchanges. 
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a 
return promised must be bargained for. 
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for 
if it is sought by the promissor in exchange for his 
promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for 
that promise. 
(3) Performance may consist of: 
(1) an act other than a promise or 
(2) a forbearance or 
(3) the creation, modification or destruction of 
a legal relation. 
(4) The performance or return promise may be 
given to the promisor or to some other person. 
It may be given by the promisee or by some other 
person. 
The law regarding considerations outlined above, when applied 
to the facts at hand, indicates the error of the Trial Court. 
At trial, Karen Edwards testified and admitted that she 
had: (1) received all of the salary that she had been promised 
(R. 109); (2) received salary increases during the time period 
she was employed with the corporation (R. 109, 110); (3) 
received bonuses including a Mexico cruise, $50.00 cash bonus, 
Christmas bonuses, and trip to Disneyland (R. 109 to 111.); and 
taken a half a day a per week off for roughly a six-month 
period. Furthermore, Karen Edwards admitted at trial she knew 
that the existence or non-existence of any bonus was dependent 
upon whether or not there was sufficient funds in the 
corporation to make those bonuses. (R. 115, 116.) 
Judy C. Smith testified at trial that she had received and 
participated in the cruise to Mexico and trip to Disneyland. 
Judy C. Smith testified that at the time of the negotiation of 
the agreement for the promise to pay her $5,000.00 to purchase 
San Saba stock, that she gave Mr. Groover nothing in return at 
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that point in time. (R. 169, 170.) (Emphasis added.) 
Furthermore, she testifed she received full payment for the 
overtime worked when on an hourly basis and had received her 
entire salary until she terminated her employment. (R. 170, 
171.) Therefore, no consideration was provided to the 
corporation, let alone Groover individually, at the time of the 
agreement. 
Judy C. Smith testified and admitted at trial that her 
reason and basis for holding the discussions with Mr. Groover 
and entering into the agreement was based upon her past hard 
work and her feeling that she was entitled to something. 
(R. 154, 155.) 
The law is clear that past consideration is no 
consideration at all. Williston On Contracts, Second Edition, 
Section 142, discusses past consideration: 
"The term past consideration or executed consideration is 
self-contradictory. Consideration, by its very definition, 
must be given in exchange for a promise or in at least in 
reliance upon a promise. Accordingly something which has 
been given before the promise was made and therefore 
without reference to it cannot properly speaking be legal 
consideration. As a general principle this is well 
recognized and illustrations might easily be multiplied to 
show it." 
Williston On Contracts, p. 620-621. 
Furthermore, past consideration has been considered not 
sufficient consideration to support a contract in case law. 
Blonder v. Gentile, 309 P.2d 47(Cal. 1957); see also Johnson v. 
Hazaleus, 338 P.2d 345, (Okla. 1959); Wantulok v. Wantulok, 214 
P.2d 477.(Wyo. 1950); Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663 
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(Nev. 1975); Matter of Mariotte's Estate, 619 P.2d 1068 (Ariz. 
1980); and Clark County v. Bonanza No. 1, 615 P.2d 939, ( Nev. 
1980). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THERE WAS PERSONAL 
CONSIDERATION TO DEFENDANT RATHER THAN THE CORPORATON 
THAT EMPLOYED PLAINTIFFS. 
Karen Edwards and Judy C. Smith testified they gave or 
promised nothing to Defendant Groover at the time the 
agreements were signed. (R. 169, 170.) 
Nor was there any other testimony presented as to the 
consideration Mr. Groover was to personally receive in exchange 
for the Agreement. Thus, Mr. Groover's testimony that a gift 
was intended stands undisputed. (R. 303.) 
The Trial Court in rendering judgment found that 
Mr. Groover had received consideration on the basis that he 
hired the employees for the corporation, the employees worked 
for several entities directed by Mr. Groover, that Mr. Groover 
was interested in the success of the corporations in which he 
owned stock because he occassionally pledged personal assets to 
support the corporations. (R. 381, Addendum 3.) 
The Trial Court overlooked the fact that Judy C. Smith and 
Karen Edwards testified they knew they worked for a corporation 
and received their paychecks from the corporation and not 
Mr. Groover. Secondly, by the very nature of the corporate 
existence, some individual must hire employees for the 
corporation. Thirdly, the fact Mr. Groover owned interest in 
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and directed several corporations that employed Karen Edwards 
and Judy C. Smith is not in and of itself sufficient to rule 
Mr, Groover received personal consideration, especially in view 
of the fact the Trial Court ruled there was not sufficient 
evidence to pierce the corporate veil. 
Finally, the fact that owners of small, closely held 
businesses pledge personal assets as collateral for 
corporations is not a valid legal reason to render personal 
liability, especially in light of today's banking practices and 
since the corporate veil was not pierced. 
POINT II 
II. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT A CONTRACT EXISTED, AN 
UNFULFILLED CONDITION PRECEDENT PREVENTS PERFORMANCE 
OF THE CONTRACT 
The law is clear that a condition precedent removes any 
legal duty to perform. 
Williston on Contracts, Third Edition §663 p. 126, states: 
"Section 663. A condition precedent is a fact or event 
which the parties intend must exist or take place before 
there is a right to performance. A condition is 
distinguished from a promise in that it creates no right or 
duty in and of itself but is merely a limiting or modifying 
factor. If the condition is not fulfilled, the right to 
enforce the contract does not come into existence. Whether 
a provision in the contract is a condition of a non 
fulfillment of which excuses performance depends upon the 
intent of the parties, to be ascertained from a fair and 
reasonable construction of the language used in light of 
all the surrounding circumstances when they executed the 
contract. 
"It is ordinarily said that a condition must be something 
future and uncertain and it is undoubtedly true that at 
least from the standpoint of the parties both futurity and 
uncertainty are necessary elements. If to their knowledge 
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the event has either already happened or cannot possibly 
happen, the promise is either absolutel or nugatory from 
the outset." 
Williston On Contract, p. 126. 
The decisions of this Court are consistent with Williston. 
In Creer v. Thurman, 581 P. 2d 149 (Utah 1978) this Court held: 
"Whether a provision in a contract is a condition, the 
nonfulfillfillment of which excuses performance depends 
upon the intent of the parties, to be ascertained from a 
fair and reasonable construction of the language used in 
light of all of the circumstances where they executed the 
contract.f" 
581 P. 2d at p. 151. 
The evidence adduced a t t r i a l proves the re was an 
u n f u l l f i l l e d condi t ion precedent of San Saba stock going pub l i c 
and the Tr i a l Court e r red in r u l i n g to the con t r a ry . 
The Court e r red in holding the re was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to 
rebut the Defendant 's evidence of a condi t ion p receden t . (Ex. 
5, 8, Addendum 4.) Judy C. Smith t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t ha t she 
knew San Saba stock was going to be issued and t h a t she was to 
accumulate i t . (R. 168.) She fur ther t e s t i f i e d t ha t she was 
to rece ive 5,000 of San Saba shares of s t ock . (R. 169.) 
The test imony a t t r i a l was as fol lows: 
"QUESTION: At the time you nego t i a t ed the agreement t h a t 
you have now in front of you, Mr. Groover gave to you a 
promise to pay you as you understand i t $5,000.00 for the 
purchase of San Saba s tock . Is tha t c o r r e c t ? 
"ANSWER: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . " 
(R. 169.) 
Moreover, Ms. Smith testified that she dated the agreement 
as of September 1, 1983, on the basis that that is when she 
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believed the corporation would be going public and she was to 
receive her stock at that time, thus indicating that there was 
a condition (of going public) on her receiving the stock. 
Further testimony was that Judy C. Smith understood that the 
$5,000.00 was for a specific stock purchase and that that stock 
was San Saba public stock. (R. 168.) 
The Agreements and the law support the condition 
precedent. The agreements provide that the employees were to 
get the cash to buy the stock. The law requires that if stock 
were given directly to an employee it would have to be 
restricted stock. Therefore, in order to get unrestricted 
stock to the employee, the purchase of the stock had to be with 
cash, after a public offering. 
The condition precedent in the agreement was substantiated 
by testimony from Mr. Groover. (R. 234, 235, 236, 237.) It 
was further substantiated by the testimony of Kathy Lowder (P. 
269) who participated in the meeting with Judy Smith and 
Richard Wiser at the time of the corporation's discussion of 
the San Saba bonus stock. Kathy Lowder's testimony was that 
they, the employees, would receive stock in San Saba, 
contingent upon it being publicly issued. (R. 269.) 
Karen Edwards testified that she asked for the entire 
$7,500.00 bonus in cash and that Mr. Groover had refused, and 
instead specifically tied the payment of the remaining 
$5,000.00 to the issuance, and her purchase, of the San Saba 
stock. (R. 127.) Karen Edwards testified (R. 127) that she 
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f r e q u e n t l y checked t o s e e when the San Saba s t o c k would be 
i s s u e d b e c a u s e she had an i n t e r e s t in i t b e i n g i s s u e d s i n c e 
t h a t ' s t h e t ime when she f e l t she cou ld r e c e i v e t h e $5 ,000 .00 
and p u r c h a s e t h e s t o c k . 
The p u b l i c o f f e r i n g of San Saba s tock never took p l a c e and 
thus t h e c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t has no t o c c u r r e d which would 
c r e a t e a c o n t r a c t u a l duty on t h e p a r t of t h e c o r p o r a t i o n , n o t 
to ment ion Mr. Groover , i n d i v i d u a l l y , to p r o v i d e the cash for 
t h e s t o c k p u r c h a s e . 
CONCLUSION 
The Cour t shou ld r e v e r s e t he d e c i s i o n of t h e T r i a l Cour t 
and ho ld t h a t t h e Defendant i s no t p e r s o n a l l y l i a b l e for t h e 
d e b t s on t h e b a s i s of no c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d / o r on t h e b a s i s of a 
c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t which has no t o c c u r r e d . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h i s l^fL day of March, 1986. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
A t t o r n e y s for D e f e n d a n t / 
A p p e l l a n t >•—^ 
E a r l JaCy Peck 
By_ 
Rober t P. Faus t 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 1986, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to John W. Call, Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/ 
Respondent at 211 East Broadway, Suite 213, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111. 
-13-
ADDENDUM 
FILMED I 
TOHN W. CALL #0542 
of HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 521-4145 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAK*" COUNTY 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
DELOY PORTER and K^TTH W. 
BF^TRIDGE dba PORTER & 
BETTRIDGF, 
Plaintiffs, 
LARRY H. GROOVER, 
Defendant. 
6ta. BLOO MO. \Qcpy 
J U D G M E N T 
C i v i l No. £4tW>£fr9-
Following trial in the above cause on August 22 and 23, 
1985, the Honorable Scott Daniels, District Judge presiding, the 
Court made an entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. Therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs, on behalf of the real party in 
interest Karen Edwards, are awarded a judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $5,000, together with interest due 
thereon at the rate of 10% from June 1, 1983, in the sum of 
$1,110.50, for a total of $6,110.50, the same to accrue interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum until paid. 
2. Plaintiffs, on behalf of the real party in interest 
Judy Smith, are awarded a judgment against the defendant in the sum 
of $1,000, together with interest due thereon at the rate of 10% 
from September 1, 1983, in the sum of $210, for a total of $1,210, 
14 **.r* 
the same to accrue interest from the date of judgment herein at 
the rate of 12% per annum until paid. 
3. Plaintiffs are awarded their reasonable costs of 
$34, the same to accrue interest at the rate of 12% per annum 
from the date of entry herein, until paid. 
DATFD this H day of September, 1985. 
BY THF COURT: 
y^«
 v J) £^ —^\ • ; Scott Daniels k
 ~ District Judge 
CFRTIFICATF OF HAND DELIVERY 
T hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Judgement this J_ day of 
September, 1985 to the following: 
Charles Hanna 
KFSLFR & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 S. State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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JOHN W. CALL #0542 
of HENRIKSEN, HFNRIKSFN & CALL, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 521-4145 
rjo'3 
',. \MyLf JO iOu^cJ 
IN THF CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKF COUNTY 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKF DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
DELOY PORTER and KEITH W. 
BETTRIDGF dba PORTER & 
BETTRIDGE, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LARRY H. GROOVER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. a4CJ£51£9-
y ° -* 
The above cause came on for trial on August 22 and 23, 
1985, the Honorable Scott Daniels, District Judge, presiding. 
Plaintiffs' real parties in interest were present and represented 
by John W. Call. Defendant was represented by Charles W. Hanna. 
Fach of the parties presented sworn testimony and documentary 
evidence. Having fully considered the evidence, the court now 
makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. By prior oral stipulation of the parties, there is 
no evidence to support the defendants Third-Party Complaint. 
2. Karen Edwards and Judy Smith, the plaintiffs1 real 
parties in interest were employed by corporations controlled by 
the defendant prior to April, 1983. 
16 
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3. The defendant promised various employees including 
Karen Edwards and Judy Smith, that they would be entitled to 
bonus compensation from the defendant's personal assets, in 
exchange for their efforts 
4. The promised bonuses from personal assets were not 
paid by the defendant prior to April, 1983. 
5. Tn April, 1983 Karen Fdwards approached the 
defendant and tendered her resignation and requested the promised 
bonus compensation. 
6. Karen Edwards and the defendant entered into a 
settlement agreement, dated April 13, 1983, which in part, 
obligated the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $5,000 
in cash, on June 1, 1983, to make her own purchase of stock in 
San Saba Energy. 
7. Judy Smith approached the defendant on April 28, 
1983 to sign a similar agreement whereby defendant, in part, 
promised to pay to Judy Smith between $1,000 to $5,000 in cash on 
September 1, 1983, to make her own purchase of stock in San Saba 
Energy. 
8. Each of the employment termination settlement 
agreements were intended by the parties as a compromise of the 
bonus compensation claimed by Karen Edwards and Judy Smith and 
not paid by the defendant during the course of their employment. 
9. Each of the documents reduced the agreement of 
employment and bonus compensation to writing at the time the 
termination of Karen Edwards and Judy Smith's employment, 
respectively. 
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10. The public issue of the San Saba Energy stock was 
not permitted by the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
11. The public issue of the San Saba Fnergy stock was 
not a condition precedent to the defendant's obligation to pay 
$5,000 to Karen Edwards and $1,000 to Judy Smith. 
12. Tt is unnecessary for the plaintiffs' real parties 
in interest to pierce the corporate veil of various of the 
defendant's business entities, in that the agreements signed by 
the defendant were in his individual capacity, and that he 
received a personal benefit and personal consideration from the 
services of Karen Edwards and Judy Smith. 
13. Karen Edwards and Judy Smith made demand upon the 
defendant for payment of said obligations which demand was 
refused. 
Having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
the Court now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's Third-Party Complaint should be 
dismissed, with prejudice. 
2. Plaintiff should be awarded judgment, in behalf of 
their real party in interest Karen Edwards, against the defendant 
Larry B. Groover in the sum of $5,000, together with interest due 
thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from June 1, 1983. 
3. Plaintiffs should be awareded judgment, in behalf 
of their real party in interest Judy Smith, against the defendant 
Larry B. Groover in the sum of $1,000, together with interest 
accrued thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from September 1, 1983. 
18 
4. Plaintiff is awarded its reasonable costs incurred 
in this action. 
5. The judgment entered herein shall accrue interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of entry. 
DATED this ^ day of September, 1985. 
Scott Darriretrs 
? i District Judge 
CERfl^lC^E OF HAND DELIVERY 
T hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law this J day of September, 1985 to the following: 
Charles Hanna 
KFSLFP & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 S. Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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4 
Groover personally, not in a representative capacity, which 
raises the presumption that he's personally liable. 
Now, he tries to cloak himself in the corporate 
veil. And the evidence shows if he's going to do that, 
we've first got to decide which corporate veil he's going 
to cloak himself in. He had a dozen of them, almost a 
dozen of them. And he ought to be concerned about his 
personal liability when all these dozen corporations are 
run out of the same office by him with people crossing over 
back and forth, doing business back and forth, purely an 
alter ego. 
With regard to the cases on piercing the corpor-
ate veil, I don't know that to promote injustice is equivalent 
to fraud. I don't think it is. I think the justice here 
is Mr. Groover signing a note personally and then trying 
to cloak himself in a corporate veil, which I think the 
evidence really indicates that he cannot do. 
We'd ask for a judgment in the amount of 
$10,000.00. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Well, for the record, 
the case is Deloy Porter and Keith W. Bettridge d.b.a. 
Porter and Bettridge versus Larry B. Groover, C84-3858. 
There are three issues, I guess, to be decided. 
The first is whether the contract is supported 
by consideration. I considered this yesterday, and I 
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thought about it some more, and I'm still convinced it is 
supported by consideration. That although there is con-
flicting testimony as between the parties on this matter, 
which kind of balances out, really, I rely considerably 
on the language and the documents as well as what was 
testified to, but to the conclusion that we're not talking 
about past consideration. We1re talking about something 
that was conceivably owed at the time of termination and 
through negotiation was reduced to this agreement. And 
I think it is valuable consideration sufficient to support 
a contract. And therefore hold that there was consideration, 
And going beyond that, I think that it was 
consideration as to Mr. Groover personally because there's 
some evidence that both of these people were hired by Mr. 
Groover personally, they worked for a number of different 
entities that were directed by him. He signed the contract 
in a personal--his personal capacity. He was interested 
in the success of his various corporations as indicated 
by the fact he occasionally pledged personal assets and 
so forth to support those corporations. So I think the 
contract, the agreements here were supported by consider-
ation and were supported by consideration personally to 
Mr. Groover. 
Secondly, the issue of condition precedent, 
again, I considered this yesterday at some length. I 
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1
 considered it since that time. And I think that the 
2 issuance, the public issuance of the San Saba Stock was 
3
 not a condition precedent to the payment of the settlement 
4
 i f — i f t h e documents were such that it was going to be paid 
5 in stock, that might be different, but the agreement clearly 
6
 was that they were going to be paid in cash when the stock 
7
 went public so they could buy the stock. And that was 
8 partially so the net result, then, would be greater than 
9 the cash amount. But that, I don't think the issue, public 
10 issuance of the stock, was technically a condition precedent 
11 on which those contracts were dependent. And therefore 
12 hold the issuance of the San Saba Stock was not a condition 
13 precedent. 
14 Therefore, based on those conclusions alone, 
15
 I hold that Mr. Groover* is personally liable under both 
16
 of these agreements, liable to Ms. Edwards for $5,000.00. 
17
 But as to Ms. Smith, I don't see how I can hold him liable 
18
 for more than $1,000.00. Her document says 1,000 to 5,000 
19
 to Judy Smith, and I don't see how he can be held for any-
20
 thing more than the minimum. Now, apparently, it's in his 
21 discretion whether it's 1,000 and 5,000, and therefore hold 
22
 he is liable to Ms. Smith for $1,000.00, to Ms. Edwards 
23
 for 5,000. 
24 i specifically find that there is not evidence 
25
 sufficient to pierce the corporate veil, but I think that 
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1 they can recover against the person, nevertheless, because 
2 the fact he entered into the contract personally and there 
3 was consideration from him personally. 
4
 Mr. Call, I'll ask you to prepare a Findings 
5 of Fact and Conclusions of Law consistent with that ruling 
6 and a judgment in the amount of 5,000 as to one Plaintiff 
7 and 1,000 as to the other, and submit to Mr. Hanna for 
8 approval as to form. 
9 MR. CALL: I will, Your Honor. Thank you, 
10 THE COURT: Court will be in recess. 
11 J (Whereupon, the trial was concluded.) 
12 
13 | * * * 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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23 
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EXHIBIT "B' 
13 Apr i l 1983 
Tnis is written verification of a verbal employment settlement agreement 
it 1 will receive $2,500.00 cash and $5,000.00 in San Saba Stock. The 
000 is to be paid in cash with the means to purchase the stock on a 
•subscription agreement, expected to take Jilace approximately 1 June 1983. 
- DEPOSITION 
] EXHIBIT 
24 
EXHIBIT "D" 
AGREEMENT 
CJX <? 
This Agreement is to Wfify that on or about September 1, .1983, 
\^Co TV ff^Wk . 
I vdll give $5,000 cash ty Judy Smith to purchase San Saba stock, 
per our employment termination settlement of April 28, I983. 
Judy 
- DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
25 
